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ABSTRACT 
Few patent claim formats present more interpretative difficulties than that of the so-called Swiss-
form.  Taking shape as purpose-bound process claims – i.e. claims directed towards a 
manufacturing process applied for a particular end – the Swiss form was originally conceived as 
an attempt to navigate treacherous waters – waters bordered by two seemingly immutable 
prohibitions on patenting: the excluded; and the old.  A jury-rigged solution to a thorny problem, 
the Swiss form claim promised to extend patent law’s incentives to the discovery of new and 
useful functions of existing medicaments: repurposing the old to create the new.  For inventions 
known in other fields, inventions with no prior medicinal purpose, a solution had already been 
given in statute; Art 54(5) of the European Patent Convention (EPC) 1973 allowed discovery of 
the first medical use of a known compound to be claimed as a purpose-bound product. Once, 
however, a first medical use for a compound was known: that was it.  Secondary indications, 
arguably no less beneficial than the first, were left out in the cold.  The Swiss-form was devised 
to bridge this gap: its purpose undoubtedly noble; its proposed effects glittering.  However, this 
virtuous façade conceals a darker underbelly: an underbelly in which the text of the Convention 
was mutilated and warped, leaving knotty, perhaps intractable, problems in its wake.  This then is 
the story of the Swiss-form: of its birth, its execution, and the more recent attempts to 
disentangle the legacy of its creation. 
 
The article is split into three parts, each dealing with specific elements of the issue under 
consideration.  This, the first, deals with the adoption of the Swiss-claim within the jurisprudence 
of the European Patent Office (EPO) and the problems associated with the manner in which the 
Enlarged Board of Appeal (EBA) of the EPO went about instigating protection for claims to 
new uses of existing medicaments.  It considers the fundamental legitimacy of the format and 
the hiatus in its interpretation that has only recently been broken.  In Part II we visit the specific 
issues raised by the regulation of the market for prescription medication in the UK.  We also 
consider some patent law fundamentals that have a bearing on the issues that are picked up in 
Part III, when we finally consider the litigation in Warner Lambert v Actavis in depth.                   
 
 
I OUTLINING THE ISSUES 
The history of the Swiss form within European Patent law is well documented.1  Under the 
European Patent Convention (EPC) as originally enacted there was no explicit mechanism that 
enabled protection to extend to a newly discovered use of a known medicinal compound.  The 
same was true of new uses in other (i.e. non-medical) fields, but for these there was a work-
around.  Thus, although a new property of an article could obviously not confer fresh novelty on 
the old thing in and of itself – the ‘thing’ in question still being known2 – processes using the 
article in new ways could still satisfy the patent bargain.3  In other words, in non-medical fields 
newly discovered properties and uses of existing things could generally be claimed as methods.  
Provided these methods also fulfilled the other requirements of patentability – in that they 
possessed inventive step and were capable of industrial application – a patent could therefore be 
granted.4  Thus if a particular chemical was known to function as a reactant5, but was 
subsequently discovered to act as a catalyst6 in certain circumstances, then a process claim could 
conceivably have been drafted to this new method of use.  However, for medicaments there 
were additional complications which meant that this ‘method’ avenue was blocked.  In order to 
avoid constraining medical practitioners in the performance of their art,7 medical methods – 
methods of treatment, surgery and diagnosis performed on the human or animal body – had 
                                                
1 See, for example, Cockbain. J., and Sterckx. S., ‘Is the Enlarged Board of Appeal of the European Patent Office 
Authorised to Extend the Bounds of the Patentable?  The G5/83 Second Medical Indication/EISAI and G2/08 
Dosage Regime/ABBOTT RESPIRATORY Cases’, (2011) 42 IIC 257.  More recently, Bosytn has also explored 
some of the history of the claim format.  See Bostyn. S., ‘Medical treatment methods, medical indication claims and 
patentability: a quest into the rationale of the exclusion and patentability in the context of the future of personalised 
medicine’, [2016] IPQ 203. 
2 And therefore not new in the sense required by Art 54 EPC 1973. 
3 In that the public would be getting something from the patentee that they had not had access to before. 
4 See, for example, the discussion of this point in Blanco-White, T.A., Patents for Inventions, (4th Ed, 1974, Stevens & 
Sons; London), at pp.19-20. 
5 i.e. a reagent that is consumed by use in the chemical reaction. 
6 i.e. a reagent that increases the rate of a reaction but is not consumed by use. 
7 G_05/83 EISAI/Second Medical Indication [1985] OJ EPO 64; [1979-85] EPOR B241, at point 22 of the Reasons for 
the Decision.  The Enlarged Board made similar comments some years later in G_02/08 ABBOTT 
RESPIRATORY/Dosage Regime [2010] OJ EPO 456; [2010] EPOR 26 when it stated, at point 5.3 of the Reasons for 
the Decision that: the exclusion was included because “physicians should be free to take all actions they considered 
suitable to prevent or to cure a disease, and in this exercise they should remain uninhibited by patents.” 
been excluded from patentability under Art 52(4) EPC 1973.8  Accordingly, claims to the new 
use of a known compound in medicine were trapped between a rock and a hard place.  The 
compound was old and therefore not novel in and of itself, and the novel use was unable to be 
claimed directly because of the statutory exclusion.   
 
In the early stages of discussions leading up to the EPC, indeed until a point following the 
adoption of a second preliminary draft of the Convention,9 this approach was to be universal 
within the medical field.  If a substance was already known then its prospects of gaining 
subsequent patent protection for a new medical use were nil.  For many in “interested circles”10, 
however, this was considered to be an unfortunate, and overly restrictive, position.  Accordingly, 
following pressure from these parties, limited respite from the harshness of this rule as far as it 
related to the first use in medicine of compounds known in other fields had been achieved during 
the drafting process.  Thus Art 54(5) EPC 1973 allowed a patent to be granted for the new use 
of a known substance or compound provided its use in “any method referred to in …[Art 52(4)] is 
not comprised in the state of the art” (emphasis supplied).  Second (and subsequent) uses were, 
however, left out in the cold.  Some years later, in a display of what might be charitably called 
creative lawyering, the Enlarged Board of Appeal (EBA / Enlarged Board) of the European 
Patent Office (EPO) ‘remedied’ this situation by extending the reach of the Convention.  
Accordingly, in G_05/83 EISAI/Second Medical Indication, 11 the EBA cast off its interpretative 
shackles and created a mechanism by which claims to second and subsequent uses of medicinal 
compounds could also gain recognition within the then extant system.  To achieve this goal, the 
Board adopted the so-called Swiss-form of claim: “use of a substance or composition for the 
manufacture of a medicament for a specified new and inventive therapeutic application”.12  
                                                
8 This sentiment was originally enacted within Art 52(4) EPC 1973.  Following revision by Diplomatic Conference 
in November 2000, the relevant provision can now be found in Art 53(c) EPC 2000.   
9 This occurred at the 4th meeting of the Intergovernmental Conference for the setting up of a European System for 
the Granting of Patents held in Luxembourg from 20 to 28 April 1971.  See Press Release dated 28 April 1971, Doc 
No. BR/122/e/71 (Press 32).   
10 This term is used to refer to the interveners in the Minutes of the 9th Meeting of Working Party I (Brussels, 17 Nov 
1971) Doc No. BR/135/71 at [92]. 
11 [1985] OJ EPO 64; [1979-85] EPOR B241.  This was one of several cases referred to the Enlarged Board of 
Appeal on the question of second medical use.  Associated decisions in Case G_01/83 BAYER/Zweite Medizinische 
Indikation [1985] OJ EPO 60, and G_06/83 PHARMUKA/Deuxième Indication Medicale [1985] OJ EPO 67 were 
published in their original German and French texts only.   
12 G-05/83 EISAI/Second Medical Indication [1985] OJ EPO 64; [1979-85] EPOR B241, at Point 23 of the 
Reasons for the Decision.  
Shortly thereafter the EBA’s approach became embedded (begrudgingly in some cases)13 in the 
national law and practice of the member states that subscribed to the EPC.   
 
By directing the claim to the manufacture of a medicament, the Swiss-form was said to avoid the 
prohibition on methods of treatment under Art 52(4) EPC 1973.  Furthermore, despite the steps 
of manufacture themselves potentially being no different from that in the state of the art, it 
provided a mechanism through which to channel novelty from the verboten use that was 
sufficient to support a patent.  Validity was therefore borrowed from the forbidden methods in 
order to validate the grant, allowing known compounds to be transformed once more into 
something new enough to satisfy the broad definition laid down in Arts 54(1) and (2) EPC by 
innovative use in the medical field.   
 
Whether this act of ‘interpretation’ of the Convention by the Enlarged Board was a legitimate or 
ultra vires expression of its powers is a debate for another time.  Nevertheless, ever since the 
Swiss-form’s inception, concerns have been raised both over its fundamental legitimacy and the 
probable difficulties that would arise upon attempting to construe its language in actions for 
infringement.14  Indeed, these concerns were such that the provisions which formed the bedrock 
of the EBA’s decision to embrace the Swiss-claim format, i.e. those covering methods of 
treatment and the medical use of compounds, were extensively redrafted when the EPC was 
amended in November 200015 – what might be described as an ex-post legislative tidying of the 
mess created by the Enlarged Board in EISAI.     
 
Upon the revised text’s entry into force, reference was made once more to the Enlarged Board 
to consider the effect of the new statutory language.  Its decision in G_02/08 ABBOTT 
RESPIRATORY/Dosage Regime16 was uncompromising: the use of the Swiss-form claim was an 
                                                
13 See, for example, Wyeth / Schering’s Application [1985] RPC 545 (UK).   
14 See, for example, Patterson. G., ‘The Novelty of Use Claims’, (1996) 27 IIC 179, at 180; Cockbain J. & Sterckx S., 
‘Is the Enlarged Board of Appeal of the European Patent Office Authorised to Extend the Bounds of the 
Patentable?’, (2011) 42 IIC 257, at 271.  Expressions of concern can also be found, for example, in Wyeth / Schering’s 
Application [1985] RPC 545, and Bristol Myers Squibb v Baker Norton [1999] RPC 253.  See also Pagenberg’s comments 
on Wyeth/Schering in (1986) 17 IIC 101, at 115.  Also ABBOTT RESPIRATORY, discussed below. 
15 At a Diplomatic Conference of Ministers held in Munich in November 2000.  A comparison of the amended text 
with that of the EPC 1973 can be found in ‘Synoptic Presentation EPC 1973/2000 – Part I: The Articles’ [2007] 
Special Edition No. 4 OJ EPO 1, at 52-55. 
16 [2010] OJ EPO 456; [2010] EPOR 26. 
“adequate but exceptional solution”17 to the problem of enabling protection for second medical 
indications under the EPC 1973 which could no longer be sustained.  Following revision of the 
Convention, the “loophole” existing in the old provisions that had required the Swiss-form 
framework to navigate had been closed and thus: “when the reason of the law ceases, the law 
itself ceases.”18  In the post-revision landscape, the claim format was deemed unnecessary and 
unsafe: not to be used in subsequent patents for second medical indications.19  Instead use-
bound product claims, i.e. “use of X for the treatment of Y”, allowable under the new Articles 
54(4) and (5) EPC 2000 for first and subsequent medical indications respectively, were to be 
used in their place.  Nevertheless, “[i]n order to ensure legal certainty and to protect legitimate 
interests of applicants”, the EBA acknowledged that its decision should have “no retroactive 
effect”.  Instead it gave a three month transitional window following the publication of the 
decision in the Official Journal20 for the prospective phasing out of the untidy Swiss-form.  
Accordingly, by 29 January 201121 all new applications were required to comply with the change 
in claim format.  Existing patents and applications made, or claiming priority before this date, 
however, could still utilise the Swiss-form claim and enjoy the attendant “legal uncertaint[ies]”22 
that accompanied it. 
 
As of 2017, therefore, the Swiss-form lives on borrowed time – the last patent containing claims 
written in this way will, all things being equal, expire at the end of January 2031 (or 2036 if 
Supplementary Protection Certificates are included in the equation).  However, there has recently 
been renewed interest paid to the moribund format as the difficulties of its construction have 
finally bubbled to the surface.  The past 12-18 months in the UK have therefore seen perhaps 
                                                
17 [2010] OJ EPO 456, at Point 7.1.1 of the Reasons for Decision; [2010] EPOR 26, at [133] 
18 Ibid, at Point 7.1.2 of the Reasons for Decision. 
19 See ibid. Point 7.1.3 of the Reasons for Decision, which contains comments concerning the inadequacy of the 
claim format as well as voicing of the prohibition on its use.  
20 Ibid. at [7.1.4].  The decision of the EBA in ABBOTT RESPIRATORY was reported in the 10th edition of the 
Official Journal of the EPO in 2010, [2010] OJ EPO 456.  This was published online on the 28th October 2010.  See: 
https://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/official-journal/2010.html. 
21 See the notice from the EPO concerning non-acceptance of claims in the Swiss form published in the Official 
Journal [2010] OJ EPO 514.  
22 See [2010] OJ EPO 456 at [5.10.4], where reference is made to the explanatory notes established by the Swiss 
delegation and annexed to the basic proposal of the revised wording of Art 54 EPC.  See further document 
MR/18/00 at point 4, available here:  
http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/B4BA2517EDFF4701C1257280005F454E/$File/mr00
018_en.pdf. 
the most activity in this field in its short life, a position mirrored in a number of other EPC 
Contracting States.  Following no less than five appearances before Mr Justice Arnold, in 
addition to two trips to the Court of Appeal, the saga of Warner Lambert v Actavis23 provides an 
interesting, indeed critical, exploration of the problems connected with the interpretation of the 
Swiss form claim.   
 
For a legal development that is now over 30 years old it is somewhat surprising that it has taken 
so long for these issues to arise.  This hiatus is all the more striking when it is considered that the 
format’s flaws had been highlighted in both judicial decisions and academic commentary for 
much of its short life.24  However, as we shall see, determining the scope of the Swiss form is not 
a straightforward affair – indeed, when considered in the abstract, one commentator famously 
noted that it was a format whose interpretation was “hardly possible”.25  Possible or not, it is 
clear that the act of its construction raises fundamentally difficult questions of function and 
form, policy and purpose.  At the end of the day, the Swiss form may be the product of the 
Enlarged Board’s good intentions, but as we all know the road to Hell is paved with similar 
material.      
 
When initially incorporated into the Convention, Article 54(5) EPC 1973 (which was, in part, to 
form the basis for the adoption of the Swiss-form) was prophetically described by Otto Bossung 
as a “cuckoo’s egg”26 – a provision foreign to the majority of the contracting States that might 
                                                
23 At first instance see Warner-Lambert v Actavis [2015] EWHC 72 (Pat) (Arnold J; interim injunction), [2015] EWHC 
2548 (Pat) (Arnold J; full trial) as well as a number of other related decisions in the case (all before Arnold J): [2015] 
EWHC 223 (Pat); [2015] EWHC 249 (Pat); and [2015] EWHC 485 (Pat).  The Court of Appeal’s decision on the 
interim matter was handed down in May 2015 - [2015] EWCA Civ 556 (CoA), and the decision at full trial in 
October 2016 – [2016] EWCA Civ 1006.  Related matters concerning the same patent formed the basis of Warner-
Lambert Company LLC v Sandoz GmbH & Ors [2015] EWHC 3153 (Pat). 
24 See note 14, above. 
25 Trüstedt W., ‘Der Patentschutz für chemische Erfindungen nach der Rechtsprechung des Bundesgerichtshofs’, 
[1974] Chem. Ing. Techn. 529, at 535.  Trüstedt, admittedly gives no detailed reasoning to back up this view…  The full 
quote, in German, reads: “Ein Schutz für eine Zweitindikation, also für den Wirkstoff, der bereits pharmazeutischen 
Zwecken dient und bei dem eine weitcre pharmazeutische Venvendung gefunden wird, ist über die Konstruktion 
eines Herstellungsverfahrens kaum möglich.”  Also discussed in Uttermann J., ‘Purpose-bound Process Claims for 
Pharmaceuticals – Two Solutions for the Second Indication’, (1986) 17 IIC 41, at 45-6. 
26 See O. Bossung, “Erfindung and Patentierbarkeit im Europäischen Patent recht” [1974] Mitteilung der deutschen 
Patentblatt 101, at 126.  It is somewhat ironic that Bossung was among the seven members of the EBA that presided 
over the EISAI decision and was therefore responsible for realising his own prophesy.  The remainder of the panel 
were Romauld Singer, Peter Ford, Roger Kämpf, M Prélot, George S.A. Szabo and J.A.H. van Voorthuizen.   
contain something unexpected.  By hijacking the Convention and unilaterally extending its reach, 
the EBA played Frankenstein, hatching and augmenting this cuckoo, creating a monster that is 
both impractical and incompatible with the fundamentals of patent law.  Now the EBA’s 
Franken-cuckoos have now come home to roost.  This is their story.  In telling this tale, we 
consider some of the issues surrounding the Swiss form’s most trenchant problem – the 
question of its scope.  We explore how these questions came to a head in the Warner Lambert 
litigation, and also ask whether the approaches adopted provide adequate solution to the 
problems raised.  This last issue is perhaps the most critical, for as we shall see, this case may be 
the first of many over the next few years which have to deal with these difficulties.  First, 
however, we turn to consider some of the background that led to the EBA’s actions.   
 
II THE BIRTH OF A CLAIM FORMAT 
As already noted, when the European Patent Convention was first promulgated it made no 
provision for the protection of new uses of existing medical compounds.  Accordingly, from the 
time it opened its doors to applicants,27 the practice of the EPO’s Examining Division, 
responsible for initial decisions on patentability under the EPC, was to reject claims directed to 
such subject-matter.28  It was reasoned that claims directed to a new use of a known medicament 
fell foul of the Convention in one of two ways.  Either they were directed at the process of using 
the compound and were thereby prohibited under Art 52(4) EPC 1973 as methods of treatment 
of the human body by therapy, surgery or diagnosis – all of which were considered incapable of 
industrial application.  Alternatively, they were directed at a product and hence claimed 
something old.  Moreover, as the compound’s first use in therapy was already known, the 
patentee could not avail themselves of the limited safe harbour created by Art 54(5).  Based on 
this logic, rejection of such claims was evidently the only option.29   
 
                                                
27 The European Patent Office opened its doors to applications for patents on 1 June 1978. 
28 The opinion in G_05/83 EISAI/Second Medical Indication [1984] OJ EPO 581; [1979-85] EPOR B241, discussed 
below, arises from a number of appeals made against refusal of European patent applications for new uses of known 
pharmacologically active compounds.  Indeed, as Bruchhausen notes, the EPO’s own Guidelines for Examination 
which were in operation before the EISAI decision of the EBA adopted the view that Art 54(5) only applied to the 
first medical use.  See Bruchhausen, “The Second Medical Use of Medicaments in European Patent Law”, (1985) 17 
IIC 306 at p.308. 
29 See for example, the outline of the Examining Division’s reasons for rejection in T_17/81 BAYER/Nimopidin 
[1983] OJ EPO 266; [1979-85] EPOR B320. 
This all changed, however, with the decision of the Enlarged Board of Appeal in G_05/83 
EISAI/Second Medical Indication30 and the consequent adoption of the Swiss-form claim.  Here the 
Board reasoned that by directing the claim to the manufacture of a medicament, it could avoid 
the prohibition on medical methods.  The manufacturing step was, after all, not directed at 
administration of the compound, and moreover could obviously be carried out on an industrial 
basis.  As such, it could not fall foul of the prohibition on patenting medical methods.  The 
Board acknowledged that there could be complications where the “medicament resulting from 
the claimed use is not in any way different from a known medicament.”31  However, it 
considered the problem could be solved by drawing analogy with the provisions governing the 
patentability of a first medical use of a known compound.  It therefore explained that in such 
cases the requisite novelty would be derived from the new use itself, and that this was the case 
despite claims to the use per se being prohibited.  The Board continued, stating that Art 54(5) 
therefore provided an exception to the general rule that could be conceived as a “special 
approach to the derivation of novelty that can only be applied to claims to the use of substances 
or compositions intended for use in a method referred to in Article 52(4) EPC [1973].”32  In 
other words, despite there being nothing in the Convention to support this view, the EBA 
declared that it was a principle that could be separated from the language of the Article itself and 
made of general application in this limited field.  Disappearing further down the rabbit-hole to 
Wonderland, the Board then explained that it could “not deduce from the special provision of 
Article 54(5) EPC that there was any intention to exclude second and further medical indications 
from patent protection other than by a purpose-limited product claim.”  In addition, no such 
exclusionary principle could be derived either from “the terms of the European Patent 
Convention; nor can it be deduced from the legislative history of the articles in question.”33   
 
The absurdity of the Board’s logic cannot escape comment.  At its core what was stated was that 
the absence of a provision specifically excluding protection for a thing that would already be 
unpatentable on other grounds could be used to infer that the unpatentable thing should in fact be 
considered patentable.  Edward Lear would be proud.  The exclusionary principles found within 
the requirement of novelty (excluding the old) and the prohibition on patenting medical methods 
were apparently not clear enough in this regard.  In addition, the fact that specific legislative 
                                                
30 G_05/83 EISAI/Second Medical Indication [1985] OJ EPO 64; [1979-85] EPOR B241.   
31 Ibid. at Point 20 of the Reasons for the Decision. 
32 Ibid. at Point 21 of the Reasons for the Decision.  
33 Ibid. at Point 22 of the Reasons for the Decision.  
provision had to be made to circumvent these hurdles in cases where an old thing was used for 
the first time in medicine appears to have been used to support the Board’s claim rather than 
contradict it.  Surely, if the rules are such that a thing, X, is excluded from protection unless 
space is specifically carved out to allow for its existence, then the fact that space is not also 
carved out for other things, Y, is indicative of the fact that protection of Y is not desired?  
Nevertheless, the Board concluded that claims for second and subsequent medical indications of 
products already known to be effective in the field of medicine would be allowed provided they 
were drafted in the Swiss-form: “use of a substance or composition for the manufacture of a 
medicament for a specified new and inventive therapeutic application.”34  Furthermore, this 
format was stated to be acceptable even where “the process of manufacture as such does not 
differ from known processes using the same active ingredient.”35 
 
And so the Swiss-form claim was born.  However, as might be assumed from the foregoing 
discussion, there are a number of problems with the approach taken by the EBA.  Thus, in 
addition to the fatally flawed logic that led it to its conclusion, the Board conveniently 
overlooked the fact that the safe harbour that had been created under Art 54(5) EPC 1973 was 
only ever intended to shield first medical use from hurricane ‘novelty’.  Such is clear not only 
from the explicit language used – provided its use in “any method referred to in …[Art 52(4)] is 
not comprised in the state of the art” – but also from the travaux préparatoires of the EPC 1973.  
A subject to which we now turn our attention. 
 
A Legislative History of Art 54(5) EPC 1973 – a fundamentally limited provision 
As noted above, the Enlarged Board of Appeal in EISAI considered that Art 54(5) EPC 1973 
contained a principle that could be separated from the language of the provision itself and made 
of general application.  Moreover, having apparently conducted its own investigation of the 
negotiations leading up to the final text of the EPC, the Board could find “no intention to 
exclude” patents on second and subsequent medical indications.36  Clearly it was not trying very 
hard.  Even a cursory reading of the final stages of the negotiations leading up to the passage of 
the EPC would appear to place beyond doubt the intention of the Member State delegations to 
exclude second and subsequent medical indications from patent protection.  The minutes of the 
                                                
34 Ibid. at Point 23 of the Reasons for the Decision. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. at Point 22 of the Reasons for the Decision. 
Munich Diplomatic Conference at which the Member States agreed and signed the final text of 
the Convention make the point eminently clear: 
 
“The Netherlands delegation proposed that the wording of [Article 54(5) EPC 1973] … 
should be improved.  It said that on no account did it wish … to break away from the 
principle that only the first application in respect of the use of a known substance or 
composition in a method for treatment of a human or animal body by surgery or therapy 
is patentable, and not the second and subsequent applications.”37 
 
Furthermore: 
 
“The Chairman … said that, in his opinion, the aim in [Article 54] paragraph 5 was to 
make clear that a known substance (or a known composition) which, since it formed part 
of the state of the art, was no longer patentable, nevertheless could be patented for the 
first use in a method for treatment of the human or animal body by surgery or therapy; 
however, a further patent could not be granted if a second possible use were found for 
the same substance, irrespective of whether the human or animal body was to be treated 
with it. 
 
The Chairman noted that his views were shared by the Government delegations.”38 
 
Separately, the report of Paul Braendli, then Vice-Director of the Swiss Federal Intellectual 
Property Office,39 which detailed the results of Main Committee I’s proceedings (and dealt with 
all substantive issues of patentability) was unequivocal on this matter:  
 
“An improved wording of [Article 54(5)] … now ensures the patentability of known 
chemicals for such uses in therapeutic and diagnostic methods as do not form part of the 
state of the art. In this connection the Main Committee was also of the opinion that only 
                                                
37 Minutes of the Munich Diplomatic Conference for the setting up of a European System for the Grant of Patents (1973, Munich), 
Doc No. M/PR/I at [54]. 
38 Minutes of the Munich Diplomatic Conference for the setting up of a European System for the Grant of Patents (1973, Munich), 
Doc No. M/PR/I at [57] to [58]. 
39 Braendli became the second President of the EPO in 1985, taking over from Johannes Bob van Benthem. 
a first use, irrespective of whether it is with regard to humans or animals, fulfils the 
requirements of this provision.”40 (emphasis supplied) 
 
Indeed, if the Board had conducted a systematic exploration of all of the supporting documents 
in the travaux préparatoires of the EPC 197341 it would have found little, if anything, to support 
the view that the member states intended any other position to be adopted.  Nevertheless, the 
seven members of the Enlarged Board in EISAI, at least three of whom were actually present at 
the Munich Diplomatic Conference,42 considered (following their “own independent studies of 
the preparatory documents”)43 that the matter had been left sufficiently open to allow them to 
conclude that:  
 
“No intention to exclude second (and further) medical indications generally from patent 
protection can be deduced … from the legislative history of the articles in question.”44  
 
This conclusion was reached notwithstanding a contemporary summary of the Munich 
Conference written by one of the self-same members of the EBA which decided EISAI 
(Romauld Singer) which points firmly against such a result.  Accordingly, Singer, writing in 1974, 
explained that during the Munich Conference the text of Art 54(5) EPC 1973 underwent 
amendment so that a more comprehensible formulation could be obtained.  The resulting 
language, he suggested, allowed the patentability of the first medicinal use of a known substance 
                                                
40 Report by Paul Braendli, Lic. iur., Vice-Director of the Federal Intellectual Property Office (Switzerland) on the 
results of Main Committee I’s proceedings, at Annex I to the Minutes of the Munich Diplomatic Conference for the setting up 
of a European System for the Grant of Patents (1973, Munich), at p. 184.  This is the same document that can be found 
numbered as Doc No. M/148/G (Munich, 1 Oct 1973).  The relevant passage can be found on p.4 thereof. 
41 Now available online arranged according to Article at http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/archive/epc-
1973/traveaux.html.  Access to a complete set of documents arranged by document number and otherwise unedited 
is available from the EPO by request. 
42 The EISAI panel consisted of Otto Bossung, Romauld Singer, Peter Ford, Roger Kämpf, M Prélot, George S.A. 
Szabo and J.A.H. van Voorthuizen.  Singer was part of the German delegation at the Munich Diplomatic 
Conference, and Bossung was also present as “Adviser” to the German delegation.  Kämpf was part of the Swiss 
delegation.  See the List of Participants in the Minutes of the Munich Diplomatic Conference for the setting up of a European 
System for the Grant of Patents (1973, Munich), at p.211-237. 
43 G_05/83 EISAI/Second Medical Indication, [1985] OJ EPO 64; [1979-85] EPOR B241, at Point 22 of the Reasons 
for the Decision. 
44 Ibid. 
or composition for therapeutic purposes, but confirmed that further inventive use of the same 
substance for medical purposes should be excluded from patentability. 45   
 
While obviously providing a consensus judgment, the Enlarged Board in EISAI did explicitly 
state that it had undertaken its own “independent study of the preparatory documents” in order 
to come to the conclusion that the second medical use should not be excluded.  It is not 
inconceivable therefore that, in theory at least, Singer had changed his mind upon re-examining 
the published travaux préparatoires a decade on from his original analysis.  Nevertheless, in light 
of the clear expressions of sentiment from the minutes of the Munich Convention outlined 
above, and this author’s own research into the process of drafting the EPC, it is difficult (if not 
impossible) to see how this could be the case.        
 
Ill-Fitting Solutions Create Further Problems 
By extending the principle of Art 54(5) EPC 1973, if not the provision itself, to the case of 
second and subsequent medical indications, the Enlarged Board constructed a framework that 
overcame the technical patentability obstacles that lay in its path.  In doing so, it jumped boldly 
over the picket-fence that marked the boundary of its remit as interpreter of the Convention and 
trespassed upon the legislative lawn.  To add insult to injury, it also painted a false picture of the 
EPC drafters’ intent – a distorted representation to legitimise legislation in the name of 
interpretation.  However, perhaps the most galling aspect of the original decision was the fact 
that, having ridden roughshod over the text of the Convention in the guise of interpreting it, the 
Board then hid behind provisions of the same in order to avoid construing the claim.  
Downstream problems of interpretation were not its concern: “It is particularly important to 
bear in mind that Article 64(3) leaves questions of infringement to be dealt with by national 
law.”46   
 
Mr Justice Jacob (as he then was) remarked in uncharacteristically restrained tones in Bristol Myers 
Squibb v Baker Norton47 that the EBA’s refusal to consider the downstream effects of its decision 
in EISAI was “not helpful”.  He continued, noting that by failing to consider the full 
repercussions of the approach adopted, the Enlarged Board created a situation that left 
                                                
45 Singer. R., ‘Das materielle europäische Patentrecht’, [1974] GRUR Int 61, at 64. 
46 G_05/83 EISAI/Second Medical Indication, [1985] OJ EPO 64; [1979-85] EPOR B241, at Point 18 of the Reasons 
for the Decision. 
47 [1999] RPC 253. 
“intractable problems for an infringement court—and for the public who need to know what 
they can and cannot do.”48  Moreover in its comments concerning the effect of Article 64(3) 
EPC, the Board significantly misstated the provision’s effects.  Therefore, rather than the broad 
proclamation the EBA had used to justify its lack of interest in the downstream effect of its 
decision, the actual wording of the Article is far narrower: “Any infringement of a European 
Patent shall be dealt with by national law.”  This, as Jacob J explained, “does not mean that 
questions of validity (especially novelty) or extent of protection are matters for national law.  On 
the contrary both are specifically matters covered by the EPC…”.49  Alan White made a similar 
point some years earlier when he stated that: “It is … not possible to divorce questions of 
infringement from considerations of validity, because both depend on the construction to be 
placed on the claim in question.  That claim construction should be decided without reference 
either to the prior art or to the alleged infringement and, only when this has been done, can it be 
decided whether such a claim is valid and, if so, infringed.”50   
 
By sidestepping difficult issues of construction in order, ostensibly, to avoid questions of 
infringement, and closing its eyes to the downstream effect of its decision, the Enlarged Board of 
Appeal therefore created a time-bomb.  Generations of patentees have relied upon the fact of 
the Swiss-form’s existence as evidence of their patents’ worth.  For some, this will have been 
sufficient: the mere fact of the patent grant being all that is needed to attract capital or to effect 
the transfer of rights to others.  Still more will have used evidence of the patent’s existence as a 
bargaining chip, throwing its weight into complex transactions with little concern for detailed 
consideration of its power to prevent the marketing of competing compounds in anything other 
than an abstract sense.51  However, for many the raison d'être of the grant of a patent is the right 
to exclude, and the right to exclude is determined by the scope of the claims.  It was therefore 
only a matter of time before the EBA’s chickens came home to roost and the limits of the claim 
format’s protection were tested.  In many respects it is amazing that this process took as long as 
it did.           
 
                                                
48 [1999] RPC 253, at p.272. 
49 [1999] RPC 253, at p.272. 
50 White A.W., ‘Patenting the Second Medical Indication’, [1985] EIPR 62, at p.63. 
51 For a discussion of some of the many different motivations that may lie behind a decision to patent and which are 
essentially unconnected with enforcement of the right against infringers see Fisher. M., Fundamentals of Patent Law: 
Interpretation and Scope of Protection, (2007, Hart, Oxford), at pp.93-7.    
III INTERPRETATIVE HIATUS 
Prior to the recent Warner-Lambert litigation,52 neither the English courts nor the Boards of the 
EPO had really engaged with the question of interpreting the intricacies of the Swiss-form 
claim.53  English decisions had mostly concentrated on issues of validity.  Accordingly, there were 
a number of authorities supporting the contention that the Swiss claim was directed to the 
manufacture of a medicament and not to the use of compound: notwithstanding that this latter 
element was the thing that provided novelty.54  English cases have also confirmed that the Swiss 
claim must relate to a process of manufacture; to interpret it otherwise, as a “product when used 
… would constitute a method of treatment which is prohibited under the EPC.”55  In terms of 
construction, however, about the closest that the English courts had got to the interpretation of 
the claim in any substantial manner was Hospira v Genethech.56  Here Birss J explained that it was 
common ground between the parties that the word “for” in the claim meant “suitable and 
intended for”.57  This was, however, as far as the judge got on this issue. 
 
Prior to the enactment of the EPC, the German courts had concluded58 that a straightforward 
purpose-limited product claim – i.e. use of an existing medicament for the treatment of a new 
disease – should be interpreted as including at least the preparation of a pharmaceutical product 
with accompanying instructions for use in the treatment of the illness.59  This entire package 
                                                
52 Discussed in detail in Part III of this series. 
53 The same can be said of a number of other European jurisdictions.  As indicated in the Warner Lambert decisions – 
see especially those of the Court of Appeal in the interim matter: [2015] EWCA Civ 556 at [72] to [98]; and at full 
trial: [2016] EWCA Civ 1006 at [189] to [201] – a flurry of interest has been paid to the scope of the Swiss-form 
only since approximately 2013.  Nevertheless, it is only since approximately 2015 that the issue has undergone 
serious analysis.    
54 See, for example, Wyeth / Schering’s Application [1985] RPC 545, where the Court (Whitford & Falconer JJ sitting en 
banc) stated (at p.563) that: “the Swiss form of claim is directed to the use of the known substance in the 
manufacture of the medicament for a new therapeutic use, and is not directed to claiming the or any instruction for 
the new therapeutic use as the invention.”  Similarly, in Actavis v Merck [2009] 1 WLR 1186, Jacob LJ noted (at [75]) 
that the Swiss-form claim: “is not aimed at and does not touch the doctor – it is directed at the manufacturer”. 
55 Bristol Myers Squibb v Baker Norton Pharmaceuticals [2001] RPC 1 at [40] per Aldous LJ. 
56 Hospira UK Ltd v Genetech Inc [2014] EWHC 1094 (Pat). 
57 Ibid. at [58]. 
58 In cases such as Benzolsulfonylharnnstoff (1978) 5 IIC 42. 
59 Although as Cockbain & Sterckx note: “Here it should be borne in mind that prior to the EPC coming onto 
effect in 1978, the German courts had a somewhat “relaxed” attitude towards the wording of patent claims.”  See 
Cockbain. J., and Sterckx. S., ‘Is the Enlarged Board of Appeal of the European Patent Office Authorised to Extend 
approach (referred to in German as augenfällige Herrichtung) was endorsed under the German 
implementation of the EPC60 by the German Federal Supreme Court (the Bundesgerichtshof 
(BGH)) in Hydropyridin.61  Here, in a judgment that arguably stretches the envelope of credibility 
to breaking point, the German court considered that a medicinal use claim (i.e. use of X to treat 
Y) should be interpreted as concentrating attention on the (ostensibly unclaimed) preparatory 
manufacturing and packaging steps.  In other words, whereas standard method claims were 
directed at the administration step (what might in this context be considered the actual use of the 
compound for the treatment of the illness or disease), a medicinal “use” claim was functionally 
presumed to cover only steps leading up to the administration of the medicine – i.e. up to, but 
not including the use itself.  Given this fiction, the court considered that claims to the “use” of a 
compound in medicine would not be caught by the exclusion within Art 52(4) EPC 1973 – this 
was reserved for method claims per se.  “Use” under this view is therefore interpreted as 
excluding the very thing to which it refers.  Sterckx and Cockbain describe this presumption as 
“ridiculous”:62 it is difficult to disagree with their assessment.  Nevertheless, the BGH continued, 
explaining that as these ‘preparation and packaging steps’ self-evidently were capable of industrial 
application then a patent should be forthcoming.  As Meier-Beck notes, the Convention’s 
exclusion63 of purpose-related product protection for the discovery of a further medical use was 
considered to say nothing about whether protection should be similarly excluded in other 
circumstances.64  In particular, where claims to use-inventions were construed as being limited to 
providing protection for a substance made-up for the therapeutic treatment and its subsequent 
application for that new treatment, then this silence was truly golden.  In this latter circumstance, 
the BGH took the view that the industrial application “precondition was met by the mere 
possibility of using the invention in industry, and that any other feasible uses were beside the 
point”65. 
 
                                                                                                                                                  the Bounds of the Patentable?  The G5/83 Second Medical Indication/EISAI and G2/08 Dosage 
Regime/ABBOTT RESPIRATORY Cases’, (2011) 42 IIC 257 at p.259 fn 9.   
60 The provisions in question were implemented under the Patent law of 1981. 
61 BGHZ 170, 215; [1983] GRUR 729.  An English translation can be found in [1984] OJ EPO 26. 
62 Sterckx. S. & Cockbain. C., Exclusions from Patentability (2012; CUP; Cambridge), at p.160. 
63 Strictly speaking, this would be better expressed as its failure to embrace: purpose-related product protection was, 
after all, only excluded by implication from the fact that Art 54(5) EPC 1973 was limited to the first use in medicine. 
64 Meier-Beck P., ‘Patentschutz für die zweite medizinische Indikation und ärztliche Therapiefreiheit’ [2009] GRUR 
300, at p.302. 
65 Bruchhausen K., ‘The Second Medical Use of Medicaments in European Patent Law’, (1985) 16 IIC 306, at 309. 
The German Hydropyridin decision “peacefully co-existed” with that of the EBA in EISAI for 
more than 20 years – “Practical relevance [having] not been achieved by the different 
approaches, as far as they can be seen”66 during this time.  Indeed, as Schneider was to remark in 
2008: “Germany still follows the Hydropyridin decision … and re-interprets the Swiss-type claims, 
granted by the EPO, as use claims.”67  However, this is not to say that the two were in absolute 
conformity and to treat them as synonymous would be a mistake.  The German approach, after 
all, treats the claim as a product and requires meaningful preparation of the entire pharmaceutical 
package in order that the object of the use claim is satisfied.  This evidently differs in form and 
content from a claim to a manufacture (as required under the Swiss-form).  Indeed, as Meier-
Beck explains, any claim of absolute harmony between the approaches which suggests there are 
“no substantive differences in the subject matter or scope of the patentable, or in the effect of 
the patent granted in one or the other version against third parties” is a result “obtained only in 
intricate ways”.68  Accordingly, while evidencing one approach that has been used to deal with 
the Swiss-form, it is clear that there is little within the Hydropyridin formulation that is of general 
application to the question of the claim format’s scope unless one is to accept that claims to 
purpose-bound processes can be interpreted as purpose-bound products.  Most are not willing 
to stretch credulity in this manner. 
 
In terms of offering interpretative clarity, things were no better in the Boards of the EPO.  
Decisions subsequent to EISAI extended the application of the Swiss-form to a vast array of 
new ‘uses’ with ever diminishing distinction between the old and the new.  Accordingly, patents 
have been granted in cases where novelty is derived from the class of patient treated (sero-
negative versus sero-positive pigs69), the technical effect of the use (making dental plaque 
removal more effective versus reducing the solubility of tooth enamel in organic acids70), and the 
                                                
66 Meier-Beck P., ‘Patentschutz für die zweite medizinische Indikation und ärztliche Therapiefreiheit’ [2009] GRUR 
300, at p.303 – translated from the original German by this author. 
67 Schneider D.R., ‘Patenting of Pharmaceuticals – Still a Challenge?’ (2008) 39 IIC 511, at p.516.  Schneider cites the 
BGH decision in Trigonellin [2001] GRUR 730 in support of this proposition. 
68 Meier-Beck P., ‘Patentschutz für die zweite medizinische Indikation und ärztliche Therapiefreiheit’ [2009] GRUR 
300, at p.303. 
69 T_19/86 DUPHAR/Pigs II [1989] OJ EPO 24; [1989] EPOR 10.  Similarly see T_893/90 QUEEN’S 
UNIVERSITY KINGSTON/Controlling Bleeding, unreported decision of the TBA dated 22 July 1993 (haemophiliacs 
vs. non-haemophiliacs). 
70 T_290/86 ICI/Cleaning Plaque [1991] EPOR 157 
mode of administration (subcutaneous versus intramuscular administration71).  Swiss-form claims 
have also been allowed to derive novelty from the sub-population of patients treated;72 the 
frequency of drug administration;73 cases where the patent claims a novel clinical situation (e.g. 
targeting tumour vasculature rather than the cancer cells themselves74); and a new dosage 
regime.75  Each new “indication” stretches the thread of novelty still further, and raises the 
potential for the territory surrounding any given medicament to become more and more heavily 
populated.  However, notwithstanding the proliferation of decisions extending the Swiss-form’s 
grasp, on the issue of construction the silence was deafening.  Indeed, until very recently about 
the  best that could definitively be said was that the format should be understood as a process 
claim and that this was accordingly narrower than the purpose-bound product protection 
allowable for first medical indications under Art 54(5) EPC 1973/Art 54(4) EPC 2000, and for 
second medical indications under EPC 2000.76  More recently, the TBA has gone slightly further 
and indicated that it would be impermissible to amend a patent containing a Swiss-form claim so 
as to turn it into a use-limited product, as this would extend the scope of the grant.77  The Swiss-
                                                
71 T_51/93 SERONO/Subcutaneous administration of human chorionic gonadotrophin, unreported decision of the TBA 
dated 8 June 1994.  See also T_138/95 GENENTECH/Intrapulmonary Delivery, unreported decision of the TBA 
dated 12 October 1999. 
72 T_1399/04 SCHERING CORPORATION/Combination Therapy HCV, unreported decision of the TBA dated 25 
October 2006. 
73 T_570/92 BAYER/Nifedipin, unreported decision of the TBA (available in German only) dated 22 June 1995. 
74 T_1642/06 SPRUCE BARBARA/Sigma receptor [2008] EPOR 12 
75 T_1020/03 GENENTECH/Method of administration of IGF-I [2006] EPOR 67. 
76 i.e. under the new Art 54(5) EPC 2000.  This point is made clearly by the Technical Board of Appeal in Case T 
1780/12 UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS BOARD OF REGENTS/Cancer treatment [2014] EPOR 28 esp. at [16]-[24].  
Here the Board explained (in the context of a case on double patenting, but the point translates clearly into 
situations of infringement) that: “[P]urpose-limited process claims vs. purpose-limited product claim … differ … in 
at least one technical feature [the manufacture of a medicament].  It is generally accepted as a principle underlying 
the EPC that a claim to a particular physical activity (e.g. method, process, use) confers less protection than a claim 
to the physical entity per se….  It follows that a purpose-limited process claim also confers less protection than a 
purpose-limited product claim.”  See point 22 of the Reasons for the Decision.  More recently, in T_1021/11 
BOEHRINGER INGELHEIM/PCV2 composition [2016] EPOR 9, one of the Technical Boards of the EPO was 
prepared to accept that for applications falling within the transitional window – i.e. applied for between the coming 
into force of the EPC 2000 and the proclaimed end of the Swiss-form’s reign following ABBOTT – it may be 
appropriate to include claims of both formats in the same patent.  Evidently this would be pointless if the claims 
were of the same scope.  See esp. points 34 to 49 of the Reasons for the Decision    
77 Art 123 EPC governs permissible amendments to the claims.  Art 123(3) states quite simply that: “The European 
patent may not be amended in such a way as to extend the protection it confers.” 
form is therefore definitively narrower than a use-bound product claim.  In making this 
comment, the Board also classified the Swiss-form as a claim limited to a manufactured 
medicament “which is packaged and/or provided with instructions for use in the [specified] 
treatment.”78  However, this singular comment is, at the time of writing, about as close as the 
Boards of Appeal have got to making any form of proclamation concerning the scope that the 
Swiss-form is to enjoy.    
 
This interpretative vacuum was, however, only part of the problem.  From a UK perspective the 
uncertainty brought by the Swiss-form claim was (and remains) compounded by aspects of the 
requirements, processes and procedures that accompany the marketing, prescription and 
dispensation of medicines.  As we shall therefore see in Part II of this series, these elements 
serve to remove much of the control over infringement from the generic supplier and place it in 
the hands of others in the supply chain.  Consideration of these factors is essential to understand 
the practical difficulties that accompany the isolation of a patented use of a medicinal compound 
that is otherwise in the public domain.  With this in mind, we will therefore commence Part II by 
briefly discussing aspects of the regulatory framework for prescription medications in the UK.  
Following this, the remainder of the article will be dedicated to the question of infringement and 
the problems raised by retro-fitting use-limitations into this arena.   
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